Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (Navy)
Nimitz was the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas in the Pacific Theater of World War II. While he led American forces to victory all over the Pacific during the war, he ignored new intelligence on the eve of the landing on Peleliu that was brought to his attention by Admiral "Bull" Halsey. This intelligence showed that the airfield on Peleliu did not have the offensive capacity to hurt the American forces or too help them in their assault on other islands in the Pacific or mainland Japan. In other words, the island did not have to be taken in order for the American forces to succeed in defeating Japan.[1]
Major General William Rupertus (Marines Corps)
Rupertus assisted in the creation of the 1st Marine Division prior to World War II and assumed command of the division for the battles on Cape Gloucester and Peleliu. Overconfident heading into the battle, Rupertus was not well liked by the men he led. Additionally, he predicted that the fighting would be “extremely tough but short” and should only last for a few days.[2] This was not the case. After the 1st Marine Division met heavy resistance at the airfield and then encountered a well dug in enemy that utilized a sophisticated system of caves/tunnels, Rupertus did not adjust tactics. He simply kept throwing American forces at the Japanese because he believed that his forces numerical advantage was all he needed to achieve victory. This proved very costly to the 1st Marine Division and led to Rupertus getting relieved from command after the battle concluded.[3]
Colonel "Chesty" Puller (Marine Corps)
Puller was the commander of the 1st Marine Regiment and, at the time of Peleliu, was already legendary for his heroics earlier in the war during the Battles of Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester. However, Puller's legendary image took a bit of a hit due to his decision making on Peleliu. Right before the assault began, Puller found out that his brother, a marine officer fighting on Guam, had been killed. Enraged, Puller ordered frontal assault after frontal assault on Japanese positions in the ridges surrounding Umubrogol Mountain, even after the 1st Marine Regiment had already sustained brutal losses. Rupertus (see above) did not act to aid or relieve Puller until he was ordered to do so by his superior (who was not even present at the battle). While a very effective commander early in the war, Puller's poor decision making on Peleliu led to a 70% casualty rate for the 1st Marine Regiment.[4] Despite his poor tactical decisions on Peleliu, Puller is one of the most recognizable officers who participated in the Battle of Peleliu. He remains famous to this day for his tough, no-nonsense quotes.
Colonel Kunio Nakagawa (Japanese Imperial Army)
Nakagawa commanded the Japanese 14th Infantry Division (the force defending Peleiu). Prior to the battle, he installed a system of caves and tunnels “honeycombed” into the ridges surrounding Umurbrogol Mountain at the center of the island. This was done due to Japan's overall change in strategy due to losses sustained in the battles leading up to Peleliu. This new strategy involved inflicting as much damage as possible on the attacking American forces.[5] This is exemplified by Nakagawa deciding to pull all remaining forces back into the extensive cave system in the ridges and make the American forces come to them after he lost half his force defending the airfield.[6] This change in strategy turned the fight on Peleliu into a battle of attrition which led to the battle causing the highest casualty rate of the entire Pacific Theater of World War II. Nakagawa committed ritual suicide when defeat became inevitable.
[1]Richard D. Camp, Last Man Standing: The 1st Marine Regiment on Peleliu, September 15-21, 1944 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2010) ix-x. [EBSCOhost]
[2]Ibid
[3]Ibid, 289-290.
[4]E.B. Sledge, With the old breed, at Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 82-83.
[5]Edward F. Drea, WARRIORS TO THE END: The Japanese Defense of PELELIU World War II (Academic Search Complete), 54-60. [EBSCOhost]
[6]Richard D. Camp, Last Man Standing: The 1st Marine Regiment on Peleliu, September 15-21, 1944 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2010) 36-37. [EBSCOhost]
[2]Ibid
[3]Ibid, 289-290.
[4]E.B. Sledge, With the old breed, at Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 82-83.
[5]Edward F. Drea, WARRIORS TO THE END: The Japanese Defense of PELELIU World War II (Academic Search Complete), 54-60. [EBSCOhost]
[6]Richard D. Camp, Last Man Standing: The 1st Marine Regiment on Peleliu, September 15-21, 1944 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2010) 36-37. [EBSCOhost]